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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALBERT J. CASTAGNO and
BERNICE B. CASTAGNO, his
wife,
Plaint iff-Respondents,
Case No. 14412

•vsMELVIN CHURCH and
ESTHER C. CHURCH,
his wife,
Defendant-Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Defendants and Appellants, pursuant to Rule 76 (e) (1),
petition the Court for rehearing in the above-entitled case for the following reasons.
1. The Court failed to consider Defendant-Appellants'
claim that the Trial Coiift erroneously denied Appellants' attempt to
introduce evidence to clarify the ambiguity of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract regarding the two second feet of water referred to in such contract.
2. The Court did not consider the Trial Court's e r r o r in
refusing to permit the,Defendants to show that the Defendants had in fact
performed as far as possible their agreement to provide the two (2)
second feet of water as contemplated by the parties.
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3. In permitting the Trial Court to invoke prohibition
against the Parole Evidence Rule, the Court prevented the Defendants from
testifying to or submitting evidence of the Defendants1 theory of damages
which would have been the alleged loss of one second foot of water at the
proposed point of diversion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendants Church were the owners of certain lands
located in Tooele County, and Mr. Church is a well driller by profession.
The Plaintiffs are residents of Tooele County and desired to purchase the
real estate owned by the Defendants Church with the understanding that a
well would be drilled on the property by the Defendants for irrigation purposes which would deliver two (2) second feet of water. For the Defendants
to deliver the agreed two (2) second feet of water from a well and pump on
the land in question, the parties had to either obtain the rights to develop
water from previously approved applications or obtain previously appropriated water, since the Tooele area had been closed to further appropriations by the Utah State Engineer's Office.

Consequently, in anticipation of

the agreement to purchase and sell Defendants1 land, the parties attempted
to obtain certain water rights from a third party with an application for change
in diversion point to the Defendants1 land being sold. However, that attempt
was frustrated by the fact thai the water right in question was in another
district which was not transferable to the district in which the Defendants1
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-3land was located. Subsequently, the Defendants Church learned through
the State Engiheer's Office that the Plaintiffs' mother had an approved
application Which had not yet been perfected, and the parties therefore
jointly arranged to obtain the approved application from Plaintiffs1 mother.
The parties agreed that the Defendants would retain three-fifths (3/5)
interest to the approved application which was for five (5) second feet of
water and that two-fifths (2/5) interest, the equivalent of two (2) second feet
of water, would be assigned to the property being sold by the Defendants to
the Plaintiffs with the understanding that the Defendants would drill and
complete the well and install a pump. The pairties agreed that they would
then jointly apply for a change in diversion point on the approved application
from the Plaintiffs' mothers property to the Defendants' property and perfect the two (2) second feet of water pursuant to the agreement.
To understand Defendants' claifri that the parole agreements
were an integral part of the contract sued upon, and to also show that the
Defendants performed their part of the contract as far as permitted by the
Plaintiffs, the following events are shown chronologically:
h,

1. Earnest money receipt for purchase of agreement,
dated March 10, 1973.
2. Assignment of water right from Plaintiffs' mother
to Plaintiffs, August 20, 1973.
3. Assignment of three-fifths (3/5) interest to approved
application number 32822, September 7, 1973.
4. Uniform Real Estate Contract dated December 14, 1973,
executed December 18, 1973.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5. Application for segregation of water right dated
February 26, 1974.
6. Application for change in diversion point for water
rights dated February 26, 1974.
7. First hearing for Defendants1 change of applications
with State Engineer, September 17, 1974, cancelled
at Plaintiffs1 request, September 17, 1974.
8. Tender of payment of Uniform Real Estate Contract,
March 13, 1975.
9. Complaint filed by Plaintiffs on or about May 15, 1975.
10. Trial, October, 1975.
After the parties had acquired the approved application
from Plaintiffs' mother and the three-fifths (3/5) interest to said application
conveyed by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants, and the other two-fifths (2/5)
interest was retained by the Defendants for the property being sold, the
Plaintiffs refused to proceed with the application for change in diversion
point, and claimed that the Defendants had failed to deliver the one (1)
second foot of water as agreed in the earnest money receipt.
Based upon Defendants' application to segregate a water
interest and to obtain a change in diversion point, a hearing was scheduled
by the State Engineer's Office.

At the insistence of Plaintiffs' attorney,

Mr. Edward Watson, the hearing was cancelled a few hours prior to the
time of the hearing and no further hearing was held on the matter, through
and including the trial date of this case. After the hearing was cancelled
at Plaintiffs' attorney's request, certain Affidavits of Protest were filed
by several of the Castagno families who arc all cousins of the Plaintiffs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in this action.

The Affidavits of Protest stated, among other things, HVH

Defendants did hot have good title to the approved application conveyed to
them by the Plaintiff Castagnos.
At the time of trial, one of the issues to be determined was
whether the Defendants Church had breached their agreement in failing to
convey to the Plaintiffs Castagnos one (!) second foot of water as contemplated
by the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The Plaintiffs contended that the

Defendants had breached their agreement by failing to deliver the rights to
one (1) second foot of water and therefore the Plaintiffs suffered damages,
being the difference between the land without irrigation and the land under
irrigation.

The Defendants attempted to show, in clarification of the

wording of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which was dated December
14> 1973, they had already performed on their agreement as to the one (1)
second foot of water since the Plaintiffs had retained the rights to perfect
two (2) second feet of water from the approved permit purchased from the
Plaintiffs 1 mother, as intended by the parties, and that one-fifth (1/5) interest
was Defendants' contribution to fulfill the provisions of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract.

The Defendants further attempted to show that the only

reason the approved application had not been perfected to meet the provisions
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract is because the Plaintiffs refused to proceed a s verbally agreed between the parties to file their application for change
in diveirsion pbint and to file a segregated application.

Further, that Plaintiffs

had their attorney caticel the hearing on the applications which had been
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scheduled prior to the trial of this case.

Furthermore, the subsequent

attempt by the Defendants to perfect the water right in question was
impeded by the protests filed by Plaintiffs' cousins.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
POINT I
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT
APPELLANTS1 CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRONEOUSLY DENIED APPELLANTS1 ATTEMPT
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE TO CLARIFY THE
AMBIGUITY OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT REGARDING THE TWO SECOND FEET
OF WATER REFERRED TO IN SUCH CONTRACT.
As outlined in the Statement of Facts, the parties contemplated obtaining two (2) second feet of water not through a new application
for appropriation, since both parties knew that the Tooele area had been
closed to new appropriations.

The parties did contemplate that a water

right would either be transferred by an application for change in diversion
point, or a previously approved application would be perfected with a change
in diversion point and beneficial use of the water.

Consequently, the parties

intentionally and with full knowledge left the well certificate number blank
on the Uniform Real Estate Contract since the well certificate number or the
number for the certificate of appropriation could not be written into the contract until the change of diversion point had been approved, the water appropriated
for beneficial use, and a certificate of appropriation approved by the State
E n g i n e e r s Office.

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants were fully apprised that

the provisions relating to two (2) second feet of water, one of which was to be
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provided by the Defendants, and one of which was to be provided by the
Plaintiffs, were water rights which the parties jointly intended to perfect
in the future.
The Trial Court, however, consistently held that none of this
evidence was adniissable because it violated the rule against parole evidence.
Defendants cbnsistently maintained that such evidence was being offered for
the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity in the Uniform Real Estate Contract
relating to the two (2) second feet of water and the certificate number which
was left blank; The Uniform Real Estate Contract was prepared by Plaintiffs'
attorney.

;^
M The rule on parole evidence in the State of Utah is well

defined.

In Jones vs. ACME Building Products, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202,

450 P2d 743, the Trial Court was confronted with the definition of the term
"net worth".

The Trial Court ruled that there was no ambiguity as to the

t e r m net worth, but the Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court's decision
and held that the term net worth was sufficiently ambigious that parole
evidence should have been permitted by the Trial Court.
In the instant case, the ambiguity is more obvious than the
t e r m net worth in that the parties referred to a "certificate number

",

which would have very little meaning without the parole testimony to explain
why the parties executed the contract without the certificate number.

Further-

more, the contract was ambiguous in not clearly defining how the Plaintiffs and
the Defendants were to each deliver the rights to one (1) share of water
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-8to the property sold by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs, when the entire
Tooele area was closed to new appropriations.
Had the Trial Court permitted the parole testimony, there
is little question that the case would have resulted in a decision favoring
the Defendants rather than the Plaintiffs.

The Statement of Facts clearly

outlines the evidence the Defendants intended to submit to the Trial Court
which was refused as being in violation of the Parole Evidence Rule.
I\)1NT 11
THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE TRIAL
COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
DEFENDANTS TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANTS
HAD IN FACT PERFORMED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE
THEIR AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE THE TWO
SECOND FEET OF WATER AS CONTEMPLATED
BY THE PARTIES.
The earnest money receipt which outlined some of the provisions of the intended agreement was dated March 10, 1973. The Uniform
Real Estate Contract was dnted December 14, 1973, and executed on the 18th
of December, 1973. During the interim between the earnest money receipt
and the Uniform Real Estate Contract, the parties, in an effort to meet their
respective obligations of providing one (1) second foot of water each to the
property being purchased by the Plaintiffs from the Defendants, attempted to
obtain water from a district other than the district within which the land in
question was located and failed in that attempt.

The parties therefore obtained

the rights, pursuant to an assignment of a previously approved Application
for Appropriation, number 32822, from the Plaintiffs 1 mother.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This was

-9accomplished in August and September of 1973, between the dates of the
earnest money receipt and the date of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
i The Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to a "well c e r ,f

tificate number

and a f 'certificate number

"

in anticipation of perfecting the approved application obtained by the parties.
Prior to the final payment of the contract, which was on March 13, 1975,
the Defendants had applied for a change in diversion point for certificate
number 32822! (February 26, 1974), and had also applied to segregate water
rights on certificate number 32822 (February 26, 1974), The Plaintiffs
refused to file similar applications for their interest on certificate number 32822. Notice for the change of application submitted by the Defendants
was published as required by law, and a hearing was set for September 17,
1974, prior to the initiation of the case before the Coiirt. On the date of
the hearing as scheduled, Plaintiffs 1 attorney, Edward Watson, and the
attorney for Plaintiffs 1 cousins, Mr. John Rokich, called and cancelled the
hearing.

The hearing was not immediately reset by the State Engineer's

Office, and was not rescheduled until February 26, 1976, four (4) months
after the trial of the above-entitled matter.
By invoking the prohibitions against parole evidence, the Trial
Court prevented the Defendants from showing that the Defendants had actually
performed, as much as permitted by Plaintiffs, their agreement to provide the
one (1) second foot of water.
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. IN PERMITTING THE TRIAL COURT TO INVOKE
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE PAROLE EVIDENCE
RULE, THE COURT PREVENTED THE DEFENDANTS
FROM TESTIFYING TO OR SUBMITTING EVIDENCE
OF THE DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF DAMAGES, SINCE
THE TRIAL COURT CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED
THAT THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION DID NOT HA VE
ANY WATER RIGHTS AVAILABLE TO THE PROPERTY.
Throughout the trial the Defendants were prohibited from
referring to the two-fifths (2/5> interest which the Plaintiffs retained of
the approved application number 32822 which the parties acquired from
Plaintiffs' mother. Consequently, the Defendants were prevented from
showing that the two (2) second feet of water which could have been perfected
pursuant to the application number 32822 was intended to fulfill the obligation
whereby the parties were each to provide one (1) second foot of water. Due
to this prohibition, the Trial Court proceeded on the assumption that no water
was available on the property purchased by Plaintiffs, and that the Defendants
had no way of providing the one (1) second foot of water contemplated by the
parties.

In fact, the Plaintiffs are still in a position to now proceed to per-

fect the water rights as to two (2) second feet of water by an application for
segregation and an application for change in diversion point and by beneficial
use and appropriation of the water. The irrigation well, which the Defendants
drilled on the Plaintiffs' property, was drilled in contemplation of these
applications for segregation and change in diversion point and is fully capable
of delivering the quantity of water which was contemplated between the parties.
Consequently, if the Plaintiffs are permitted to prevail as the
Trial Court decided, the Plaintiffs will have the benefit of a well completed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-11with pump and a two-fifths (2/5) interest in and to an approved application
representing two (2) second feet of water which could be perfected at any
time Plaintiffs desire, and a reduction in contract price of Twelve Thousand
Dollars ($12,000) as ordered by the Trial Court, and the further benefit of
having land with a fair market value of Fifteen Hundred Dollars ($1, 500) per
acre immediately after the perfection of the two-fifths (2/5) interest in and
to the approved application number 32822.
CONCLUSION , ;
I

The Defendants respectfully submit that the Court failed to

properly review the Trial Court's error in refusing to permit evidence,
both written and parole, to clarify what the parties had intended regarding
the two (2) second feet of water which was to be contributed equally between
the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. By doing so, the Court further deprived
the Defendants of the right to show the proper measure of damages, if any,
which the Plaintiffs might have suffered, which would be the Defendants1
failure to deliver one (1) second foot of water at the proposed point of
diversioh on the land sold by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs.
The evidence clearly shows that the irrigation well was
drilled by the Defendants as agreed, that there was water available in the
well for irrigation purposes, that the Plaintiffs still have a two-fifths (2/5)
interest in and to an approved application for appropriation of water, that
the Plaintiffs had used, on a temporary basis, the water available in the
well, that the Plaintiffs have had sufficient water to irrigate crops with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12water from the well, and there is no reason to believe that the two-fifths
(2/5) interest in and to the approved application number 32822 cannot be
perfected by Plaintiffs1 application for change in diversion point, for
segregation of water rights, and by actual beneficial use.
If the Trial Court's decision is upheld, the Plaintiffs are
left in a position of having reduced the contract price for the land which
they purchased from Eight Hundred Dollars ($800) to Five Hundred Dollars
($500) per acre, of having obtained an irrigation well and the right to perfect
two (2) second feet of water on the land purchased by the Plaintiffs, all to
the detriment of the Defendants, and according to Plaintiffs1 own evidence,
the land purchased by the Plaintiffs would have a fair market value of Fifteen
Hundred Dollars ($1,500) per acre since the irrigation water is available to
the Plaintiffs.
Finally, the Defendants are left in a position of having a
three-fifths (3/5) interest in and to the approved application number 32822
which they have thus far been unable to perfect because of the protests filed
by Plaintiffs' cousins, although the Plaintiffs themselves have not submitted
a protest.
The Defendants respectfully submit that the entire case
should be remanded to the District Court for a new trial which would include
a cause of action to quiet title to the approved application number 32822
which was acquired by the Defendants from the Plaintiffs, who acquired
the same from Plaintiffs' mother. Since the Defendants obtained the rights
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13they may have to the approved application number 32822 from the Plaintiffs,
the Trial Court should also determine what damages, if any, the Defendants
suffered from Plaintiffs' failure to deliver clear title to the approved permit.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Phil L. Hansen and Associates
250 East Third South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
KENNETH M. HISATAKE
555 East Second South, Suite 215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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